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Abstract
The extent of  corruption in Iceland is highly contested. International corruption 
measures indicate a relatively small amount of  corruption while domestic public 
opinion suggest a serious corruption problem. Thus, uncertainty prevails about 
the actual extent of  corruption and whose perceptions to rely on. This problem 
is relevant for corruption research in general. Perceptions are increasingly used 
as proxies for the actual levels of  corruption in comparative research. But we 
still do not know enough about the accuracy of  these proxies or the criteria 
they must meet in order to give dependable results. In fact, radical differences 
exist concerning evaluations of  perceptions between those who believe in 
unbiased learning and those believing perceptual bias to be widespread. The purpose 
of  this article is, therefore, to attempt to gauge which factors may influence 
how perceptions of  corruption are shaped and why differences in corruption 
perceptions between different groups may be so pronounced. We present 
findings from original survey data from three parallel surveys – among the 
‘public’, experts, and ‘municipal practitioners’ – conducted in Iceland in 2014. 
Expectations based on the perceptual bias approach are tested, indicating that 
perceptions may be affected by (1) information factors, (2) direct experience 
of  corruption and (3) emotive factors. The validity of  perception measures 
should be considered with this in mind. Domestic experts are likely to be well 
informed and avoid perceptual bias to a greater extent than other groups. Our 
examination of  the Icelandic case suggests that the Corruption Perception 
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Index (CPI) tends to underestimate corruption problems in ‘mature welfare 
states’, such as Iceland, whilst the general public tends to overestimate it.  
Keywords: corruption; corruption perceptions; Corruption Perception 
Index; unbiased learning; perception bias; Iceland.
Introduction
A controversy has raged about the levels of  corruption in Iceland.1 According to Trans-
parency International’s (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Iceland was ranked as 
the least corrupt country in the world in 2004 and 2005. Several authors have disputed 
the exactness of  this evaluation, maintaining that cronyism, nepotism, clientelism and 
other forms of  abuse of  power probably played a role in the genesis of  the financial 
crash in 2008 (e.g. Johnson et al. 2013; Gylfason 2014; Vaiman et al. 2011; Wade and 
Sigurgeirsdottir 2010), while others have argued practices such as cronyism indeed has 
had a long history in Icelandic politics (Kristinsson 2012).
Is the CPI seriously flawed in the case of  Iceland? One recurring criticism is that the 
CPI to a large degree relies on perceptions of  foreign business executives and assess-
ments from experts, perceptions that generally are based from outside the country in 
question (see for example Thompson & Shah 2005; Arndt & Oman 2006; Andersson & 
Heywood 2009). In addition, these assessments tend to hinge on bribe-giving and bribe-
taking, i.e. not de facto measuring the somewhat broader phenomenon of  corruption 
as captured by the standard definition employed by for example TI itself, i.e. ‘the abuse 
of  entrusted power for private gain’. Measures that primarily or only look at bribes, of  
course, tend to disregard more ‘sophisticated’ (e.g. Papakostas 2009) variations of  illicit 
behavior associated with the concept of  corruption, precisely behavior that is tied to 
cronyism, nepotism and clientelism and other forms of  violations of  the norm of  im-
partiality (e.g. Rothstein & Teorell 2008).
Consequently, and perhaps unsurprisingly, scholars have demonstrated discrepancies 
between how international experts perceive and describe the problem of  corruption 
in a given country, and how citizens living there actually perceive it, e.g. Lin and Yiu 
(2014) for Asia, and Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010) for sub-Saharan Africa. Taking 
Sweden as an example, Bergh et al (2016) highlight that despite the fact that Sweden is 
continuously ranked as one of  the world’s least corrupt countries, its citizens seem to be-
lieve that Sweden’s corruption problems are considerably more widespread and serious 
than international indices like TI would lead us to believe; and this holds true particularly 
when compared to Denmark and Norway.
Where does this leave us? We agree with Teorell (2014) that perceptions of  course 
are not perfect measures. But, perceptions are probably the best measure we got and – 
depending on the quality of  the data – could in some cases be a good indicator of  the 
extent of  corruption. However, the question of  whose perceptions should be consulted, 
and about what they should be asked, needs to be carefully considered. 
Against this backdrop, it is pressing to analyze why mismatches in corruption per-
ceptions among different categories of  actors are observed; i.e. why we in some instanc-
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es see pronounced differences between for example “international experts” and more 
country specific sources such as “ordinary citizens”, “domestic experts/analysts” and 
“domestic politicians and civil servants”. More precisely, the mismatches that have been 
observed make it interesting to ask which factors seem to influence how perceptions of  
corruption are shaped at the level of  the individual within different groups. This brings 
us to the general question addressed in this article: whose perceptions should we rely on 
when assessing the extent of  corruption in a given country, and what are the pros and 
cons of  consulting different demographics?
The article proceeds as follows. We start out by summing up the main theoreti-
cal claims concerning the subject at hand and derive expectations from what has been 
dubbed “the perceptual bias approach”, which basically suggests that public perceptions 
may be biased in a number of  ways. We then go on describing our data and give argu-
ments for why we have selected Iceland as our case, before presenting findings from 
original survey data which stem from three parallel surveys conducted in Iceland in 2014 
in order to analyze our expectations. 
1. Perspectives on corruption perceptions: what should we expect?
If  we plan to use perceptions as an instrument gauging corruption, we need to address 
the question of  validity. Perceptions can either be taken at face value, i.e. as more or less 
accurate reflections of  reality, or they can be subjected to critical evaluation as poten-
tially biased and hence more or less inaccurate. These two positions have a distinguished 
pedigree relating to fundamental issues of  epistemology and the philosophy of  sci-
ence. In the present context, however, we wish to escape as far as possible the broader 
philosophical context and concentrate on the matter as it relates to corruption. In line 
with the approach adopted by e.g. Gerber and Green (1999) and Fischle (2000) – who 
incidentally advocate rather different positions – we distinguish between the theory of  
unbiased learning and that of  perceptual bias. 
According to proponents of  unbiased learning, experience is a relatively sound 
source of  knowledge and people can, for the most part, be relied on to perceive things 
accurately given fairly basic conditions. While early voting research in the US seemed 
to fundamentally challenge this position (Campbell et al. 1964), subsequent research is 
more ambivalent (e.g. Nie et al. 1976). Gerber and Green (1999) argue that, generally 
speaking, there is surprisingly little evidence for selective perceptions of  the kind re-
ported e.g. in the American Voter study and in the U.S. context: Democrats, Republicans 
and Independents perceive current events in a similar manner. 
When it comes to corruption research, Transparency International (2010) has con-
ducted analyses in order to demonstrate that the Corruption Perception Index does not 
diverge all too much from how ordinary citizens perceive problem. In line with this, 
Holmberg (2009) has reported strong rank order correlations between public and expert 
perceptions of  corruption, and Charron (2016) finds evidence of  strong international 
correspondence between country rankings based on corruption perceptions and cor-
ruption experiences. Charron concludes that ‘strong counter-evidence is found to the 
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prevailing pessimistic claims in the literature – the consistency between actual reported 
corruption, as well as citizen and expert perceptions of  corruption, is remarkably high 
and such perceptions are swayed little by ‘outside noise’’ (compare also e.g. the literature 
review in Lin and Yu 2014: 144). 
While the correlations between public and expert perceptions suggest that they are 
to some extent exposed to similar factors, it is entirely possible that one group nonethe-
less has systematically exaggerated perceptions of  corruption compared to the other. 
High correlations do not preclude such a possibility. Imagine a four case scenario where 
experts and public rate corruption on a ten-fold scale in the following way: Thus 10:60, 
20:70, 30:80 and 40:90. Pearson’s correlation would yield a perfect r = 1.00*** despite a 
substantial and systematic difference in expert and public perceptions where the public 
perceives far greater corruption than the experts. 
The perceptual bias position suggests that perceptions can be flawed and manipulated 
in a number of  ways. It is well known from different strands of  social research that sur-
veyed perceptions may differ considerably from objective indicators. Examples include 
institutional performance (Flynn 2007) and crime perceptions, where there seems to 
be a strong tendency among survey respondents to overestimate the threat from crime 
(e.g. Baier et al. 2016). This has influenced research in sociology and social psychology, 
indicating that perceptions are in many cases selective or biased. According to research 
on motivated reasoning and related topics, individuals react to information on the basis 
of  prior affect and partisanship, and may hence be susceptible to attribution errors in 
detecting deceptions (e.g. Burden & Hillygus 2009; Fischle 2000; O’Sullivan 2003). 
Therefore, a large number of  factors may influence perceptions independently of  
the actual level or direct experience of  corruption. Donchev and Ujhelyi (2014) maintain 
that corruption experience is weakly related to corruption perceptions in international 
research while economic development, democratic institutions and Protestant traditions 
may systematically lead to lower perceptions of  corruption. Factors which are likely to 
affect perceptions of  corruption within a single system include partisanship and ideol-
ogy, socioeconomic status and political involvement.  
According to this, direct experience of  corruption may give a better indication of  
its actual levels than beliefs and perceptions because it is more objective. Respondents 
reporting perception may be influenced by a number of  factors, but when asked about 
facts (actual experience) the scope for subjective evaluations is more limited (although, 
of  course, it may still well exist). Rose and Mishler (2007) point out, in the case of  Rus-
sia, that there is a “big gap between the 86 percent who perceive most public officials 
as corrupt and the 23 percent who say their household has paid a bribe in the past two 
years’ concluding that ‘neither the payment of  bribes nor the number of  contacts with 
public officials has a significant effect on the perception of  corruption” (p. 1). Hence, 
“individual and aggregate perceptions of  corruption are not a surrogate indicator for 
actual corruption in Russia” (p. 20) they maintain and ‘a bad press and bad mouthing 
are more important than bad experiences in determining perceptions of  corruption’. 
According to the perceptual bias approach we should therefore not expect close cor-
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respondence between experience of  corruption and perceptions of  corruption among 
the public.
Some smaller groups, however, may have an information advantage compared to the 
general public. These are the (somewhat imprecisely and loosely termed) ‘experts’ on 
which expert surveys build. While the general public may typically lack the information 
and skills required for accurate evaluation, smaller groups of  experts or persons with ex-
tensive experience in the relevant fields (e.g. elites) can provide a more accurate account. 
As Lin and Yiu (2014) argue: through education, training, and experience, experts gen-
erally have specialized knowledge in some particular subject and can hence act as more 
reliable sources of  information than the public; for instance, when it comes to gauging 
the level of  corruption within a country. 
Accordingly, expert surveys have gained increasing currency in political science in 
recent years, often – as Clinton and Lewis (2007, 4) point out – providing means of  
“assessing quantities that are not easily quantifiable”. In the case of  corruption research, 
in fact, expert surveys have become the standard tool for measuring corruption and 
comparing levels of  corruption cross-nationally. The advantages of  employing expert 
opinions, however, still begs the question of  which experts, chosen from where, are rel-
evant for what types of  questions.
To take but one example, most famously, TI’s Corruption Perception Index is basi-
cally a composite measure based on expert perceptions. While the accuracy of  expert 
measures is in some cases contested (see for example Anderson & Heywood 2009), a 
perhaps more damaging criticism is aimed at the choice of  experts and what questions they 
are presented with, rather than the core idea of  asking the people who should know. 
Foreign businesspeople, on which TI partly relies, may not be well suited for gauging 
corruption levels in a given country, and confining the search with bribes may blind re-
searchers to other more subtle, or ‘sophisticated’, forms of  corruption. 
At any rate, according to Teorell (2014, 67), there is no research – at least to his 
knowledge, as he puts it – suggesting that expert evaluations are systematically biased in 
the same manner as public opinion. In advanced countries, Maeda and Zigfeld (2015) 
argue, social position may affect perceptions of  corruption. High-income and highly 
educated citizens tend to perceive lower levels of  corruption compared with other citi-
zens (p. 5). Blais et al. (2015) also come to the conclusion in most of  their cases that the 
better informed citizens perceive less corruption than less informed ones. Hence, we 
expect that the general public diverges considerably from groups with an information 
advantage in its perceptions of  corruption; and we expect the groups to diverge in two 
ways in less corrupt countries:
• The public is likely to perceive higher levels of  corruption than elite groups.
• Differences in perceptions in countries with lower levels of  corruption are likely 
to be particularly large with regard to the more serious forms of  corruption – 
i.e. the general public will perceive it to be higher compared to groups with an 
information advantage.
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Additionally, research in the perceptual bias tradition suggests that a whole range of  
emotive factors are likely to influence corruption perceptions. This includes a number 
of  partisan and ideological factors. Thus, Blais et al. (2015, 6) note that partisans of  in-
cumbent parties perceive less corruption while non-partisans and less informed perceive 
more. Voters tend also to be more tolerant towards corruption cases when they affect 
their own parties than others (Anduiza et al. 2013). We therefore expect emotive factors, 
in particular ideological ones – i.e. whether or not one supports the insider/ruling par-
ties or not – are likely to influence perceptions of  corruption. Basically, then, there are 
three expectations we have on our empirical material, which we will study below:
1. Contrary to the unbiased learning approach, but in line with the perceptual bias 
approach, we expect not to find any strong connection between experience of  
corruption and perceptions of  corruption among the public. Something else, 
besides experience, explains how the majority of  the public assesses the prob-
lem of  corruption.
2. Related to the expectation above, we also expect that the general public diverges 
considerably from ‘experts’ (i.e. people with an information advantage) in its 
perceptions of  corruption; and we will see the divergence manifested in higher 
general levels of  corruption perceived by the public especially with regard to the 
more serious forms of  corruption.
3. We expect emotive factors, and in particular whether or not one supports the 
insider/ruling parties or not, will influence perceptions of  corruption: outsiders 
will perceive the problem to be worse, than supporters of  the majority/insider 
parties.
Grounded in an analysis of  these expectations here below, we will sum up with a tenta-
tive evaluation of  whose opinions about what one ought to pay closer attention to if  
one is really interested in the level and seriousness of  the corruption problem within a 
country. 
2. Case selection, data and approach
In our quest to initiate an informed discussion on what factors shape perceptions of  
corruption, we have collected data from one of  the world’s most homogeneous coun-
tries – Iceland. Theoretically, we believe homogeneity is crucial when addressing the 
subject at hand, since homogeneity suggests that different segments of  the population 
are likely to be subject to similar media coverage, influences and experiences of  cor-
ruption. This means that our research design does not have to take into account the 
potential bias created by radically different experiences, cultures or scandals revealed by 
the media.
Firstly, there are no substantive ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities in Iceland, 
although a trickle of  immigration in the last few decades has modified the uniquely high 
level of  cultural homogeneity to a certain extent. According to the Global Gender Gap 
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report, Iceland also was the most gender equal country in the world in 2015 (1/145) 
(World Economic Forum 2015) and the Gini-index, according to World Bank estimates, is 
among the lowest, indicating a similar level of  income equality as in the other Nordic 
countries.2 
Importantly for our purposes, media literacy is high. According to Gallup polls, a 
large proportion of  the population reports using major media on a regular basis.3 Given 
the small size of  the media market there are only two major newsrooms serving the 
television and radio market. The situation for printed media is not much different. Al-
though the political forces regularly attempt to influence the media, the agenda and style 
of  reporting is basically similar.4 Hence, most Icelanders will have approximately the 
same information about most known scandals, and in addition, it is highly unlikely that 
media users in Iceland experience radically different versions of  scandals and corrup-
tion through media reporting. We therefore argue that Iceland´s homogenous character 
makes it well suited for the analysis of  perceptions of  corruption among different seg-
ments of  the population within one and the same country. 
Our research design is focused on three parallel surveys conducted at the end of  
2014 among groups which may be assumed to be exposed to different types of  influ-
ence concerning corruption perceptions in an otherwise homogenous population. In 
these, we targeted three demographics that we argue to be theoretically relevant for the 
purposes at hand which for reasons of  simplicity are called: the ‘public’, the ‘experts’ and 
the ‘municipal practitioners’ (the last group being a combination of  local government 
officials and politicians). These three groups of  respondents were chosen to reflect what 
we believe being different levels of  knowledge, experience and exposure to perceptual 
bias. Knowledge can be assumed to be high among ‘experts’, and relatively high also 
among ‘practitioners’ – although perhaps more limited in scope. Compared to these 
groups, we should expect knowledge among the ‘public’ to be at a lower level.
Direct experience of  corruption is likely to vary with the actual amount of  corrupt 
activity taking place. The public is likely to have direct experience of  corruption in 
highly corrupt systems where corruption is ‘systemic’, but less so in low-corrupt settings 
where corruption has an ‘isolated’ character (e.g. World Bank 1997). The type of  corrup-
tion one experiences may also be different. The same goes for experts, although experts 
with close associations to government are likely to come into contact with (or know 
about concrete cases of) corruption more commonly than the public. Practitioners are 
also likely to have more direct experience of  corruption than the public. 
As regards sources of  bias, these may affect all three groups, while a priori we should 
expect the experts to be least affected, everything else being equal, given their higher 
level of  knowledge and experience of  government. The public, with smaller knowledge 
and less direct experience (assuming a low corruption case) may be more subject to 
biased perceptions than the experts. The practitioners, despite considerable firsthand 
knowledge, may be more biased than the experts given their close association, and prob-
ably closer emotional attachment, to the political system and local government. This 
could lead them to focus on justifications of  questionable practices at the expense of  
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principles of  impartiality, or alternatively, have incentives to paint a cleaner picture of  
what is going on at the local level: because of  their status as ‘insiders’ they could be 
suspected to have a stake in the issue at hand, and hence prone to underreport the fre-
quency of  corruption. 
Data was obtained by running three parallel surveys in Iceland 2 – 29 Dec. 2014 
using, for the most part, the same battery of  questions. The three groups surveyed 
were firstly a stratified random sample of  panel respondent contacted by the Social Sci-
ence Research Institute of  the University of  Iceland, representing the general public. 
The number of  respondent was 960 and net response rate 66%. The second group of  
respondents included elected representatives and top administrators in municipalities 
(‘practitioners’) with over 2 thousand inhabitants. Respondents were 208 (a response 
rate of  70%) of  whom 60% were elected representatives and 40% administrators. The 
final group of  respondents represents a group which comes as close to being expert 
respondents as possible. Members of  the Public Administration Association in Iceland 
(where a master’s degree in public administration is an entry requirement) were ap-
proached and answers received from 79 respondents, which amounts to a net response 
rate of  66%.
3. Results and analysis
Our dependent variable is perceptions of  corruption. Perceptions of  corruption were 
measured in an identical manner among the public, the experts and the practitioners. 
Table 1. Public evaluations: “If you think about the municipalities in Iceland” …
Extortion Embezzlement Bribes Fraud Favoritism
How 
frequently 
or rarely do 
you think 
politicians 
or public 
employees 
give in to 
threats of 
some kind?
How frequently 
or rarely do 
you think 
politicians or 
public employees 
embezzle funds 
to obtain income 
above their 
proper earnings?
How frequently 
or rarely do you 
think politicians 
or public 
employees 
accept 
payments or 
benefits in 
exchange for 
favors?
How frequently 
or rarely do 
you think 
politicians or 
public employees 
hide important 
information or 
intentionally 
give misleading 
information to 
avoid criticism?
How frequently 
or rarely do 
you think 
politicians or 
public employees 
favor political 
allies, cronies or 
relatives when 
making public 
appointments?
Never happens 2 0 2 0 0
Very rare 16 17 10 5 2
Rather rare 18 19 13 7 3
Sometimes happens 39 30 24 30 23
Rather common 18 23 30 30 33
Very common 7 11 21 27 39
Total 100 100 100 100 100
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First, respondents were asked about perceptions of  different types of  corruption in lo-
cal government, on the assumption that respondents among the public are more likely 
to have direct experience of  local rather than national level corruption. Later in the 
questionnaire respondents were asked about their perceptions of  the general level of  
corruption among politicians, public employees and in local governments. In tables 1 
and 2 we show how the response was distributed.
Rather than using the word corruption (or related concepts), we opted for describing 
the activity in question.5 The purpose was to, as far as possible, avoid the strong norma-
tive connotations often associated with the concept of  corruption. We have no defini-
tive way of  deciding at this point if  the figures in table 1 should be considered high or 
low. However, for a country that generally speaking and historically has been considered 
a low-corruption case, some of  the figures are surprisingly high. The most common 
form of  corruption in local government according our respondents is favoritism in 
public appointments, which 72% think is common or very common.  Fraud scores lower 
(57% think it is common + very common), followed by bribes (51% common + very 
common), embezzlement (34% common + very common) and extortion (25% com-
mon + very common). The most surprising figure is perhaps the one concerning bribes, 
which in the Icelandic public debate are generally not considered to be particularly com-
mon and very few court cases exist where public officials have been charged with or 
found guilty of  accepting bribes. 
A different item in the questionnaire concerned more general evaluations of  cor-
ruption in Iceland, among politicians, public employees and more specifically, in the 
municipalities. 
Table 2. Public evaluations: “How common do you think corruption is in Iceland 
among…”
Politicians Public employees Local governments
Hardly takes place 3 5 5
Rather rare 28 38 33
Rather common 45 40 45
Very common 24 17 17
Total 100 100 100
 
Again, the figures must be viewed as surprisingly high, considering that Iceland has 
traditionally been viewed as one of  the world´s least corrupt countries in international 
indices. Corruption is thought to be relatively common among politicians (69% rather 
or very common) but a sizeable majority of  respondents also thinks it is rather or very 
common in local government (62%) and among public employees (57%).6
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3.1 Direct experience and corruption
We expect corruption perceptions to be influenced by a number of  factors apart from 
direct experience. Direct experience is therefore expected to be only moderately cor-
related to perceptions. 
Respondents among the public were asked about their experiences of  corruption, 
i.e. if  they had personal experience, knew someone with personal experience, if  they 
had heard of  such things or knew of  them through the media. (Questions were asked 
concerning each type of  corruption separately so the figures in table 3 do not add up 
to 100%).
Table 3. Experience of corruption among voters (% of respondents reporting 
experience)
Personal 
experience
Know someone 
with personal 
experience
Heard about such 
things
Know of it through 
the media
Favoritism 18,9 38,6 62,2 52,7
Fraud 13,3 21,0 57,9 61,8
Extortion 7,0 18,4 62,5 50,1
Bribes 6,8 22,7 64,6 46,0
Embezzlement 7,8 20,8 55,0 59,0
A striking difference appears between the perceptions of  corruption reported in 
table 2 and personal experience in table 3. Whereas 51 – 72% of  respondents believed 
favoritism, fraud and bribes to be common, only 7 – 19% report personal experience 
of  such activities. In the case of  bribes, for example, 51% of  respondents believe them 
to be rather or very common while 93% have no personal experience of  such activities. 
And importantly, considering only those who believe bribes to be common or very com-
mon, only 15% of  them have any personal experience of  them whatsoever.
To test the relationship between experience and perception of  corruption we ran 
correlations between dummy variables representing the different types of  experience 
(0 = no experience, 1 = experience) and the different types of  corruption. The rela-
tionships between personal experience and perceptions of  corruption turned out to be 
weak (r between .16 and .25). Knowing someone with personal experience gave slightly 
stronger correlations (r between .22 and .31) but still, the figures are far from convinc-
ing. Having heard about corruption or knowing of  it through the media basically gave 
no meaningful correlations (r was from -.11 to .16). 
To test the relationship of  experience with corruption perceptions still further, we 
constructed a fivefold scale to measure the ‘directness’ of  corruption experiences. Ac-
cording to this measure 0 means no experience of  corruption, 1 only media experience, 
2 that the most direct experience was hearing about corruption, 3 means knowing some-
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one with personal experience and 4 having personal experience. Again, the results were 
less than convincing: while the relationships were statistically significant for all types of  
corruption, they were on the whole weak, giving r between .32 and .37. Such weak cor-
relations (explained variance around or below 6%) give – we maintain – little reason to 
believe that direct experience, generally speaking, has an important impact on corrup-
tions perceptions among the public. This supports the first expectation we formulated, 
i.e. that direct experience of  corruption is not going to explain corruption perceptions 
among the general public, whose perceptions are likely to be influenced by a range of  
other factors. 
3.2 The public compared to groups with information advantage
The second expectation we formulated stated that we expect the public to diverge con-
siderably from groups which can be assumed to have an information advantage in that 
the public is likely to overestimate the amount and the seriousness of  corruption tak-
ing place. We used two elite groups for comparisons with the general public, on the 
one hand ‘experts’ (members of  the Public Administration Association) and ‘munici-
pal practitioners’ (local officials and council members). Comparisons between the three 
groups in table 4 are presented on the basis of  the proportion in each group claiming 
corruption to be rather or very common.
Table 4. Perceptions of corruption among public, experts and practitioners (% 
claiming corruption to be rather or very common).
Public Experts Public/expert Practitioners Public/
practitioners
Favoritism 72 60 1,2 21 3,4
Fraud 57 33 1,7 16 3,6
Bribes 51 17 3,0 2 25,5
Embezzlement 34 15 2,3 3 11,3
Extortion 25 18 1,4 7 3,7
Table 4 reveals a substantial difference between public perceptions of  corruption 
on the one hand, and experts and practitioners on the other. In all cases the public is 
considerably more prone to believe that corruption is common compared to the elite 
groups which we assume to have an information advantage. Thus, members of  the 
public are three times as likely to believe that bribes are common compared to the ex-
perts and more than twice as likely to believe embezzlement is common. With regard 
to favoritism, fraud and extortion the difference is smaller, but still considerable in all 
cases. The difference between the public and practitioners is even more pronounced. 
Members of  the public are more than 25 times as likely to believe bribes to be common 
as practitioners and over 11 times as likely to think the same of  embezzlement. In the 
case of  extortion, fraud and favoritism the difference is less striking but still very con-
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siderable. Practitioners are in all cases less likely to believe corruption is common than 
the experts. We shall return to the difference between experts and practitioners below. 
However, suffice to say here, is that the fact that practitioners are less prone to see cor-
ruption than the two other groups could be interpreted in view of  the fact that they can 
be regarded as insiders, in a sense making statements about their own backyard, and 
hence not necessarily with them having a ‘information advantage’.
An interesting feature of  table 4 is that although there are marked differences in 
how widespread beliefs in corruption are between the three groups, some trends and 
similarities are to be observed as well. Among all three groups, favoritism is the most 
commonly perceived form of  corruption in Iceland, followed by fraud. Bribes, embez-
zlement and extortion are believed to be less common among all the surveyed groups, 
although the belief  that bribes are common is particularly common among the public. 
This indicates that while the tendency for exaggerated beliefs in corruption may affect 
the groups differently, they are nonetheless subject to some common influence which 
affects the relative spread of  such beliefs, i.e. which type of  illicit behavior is most com-
mon as well as rarest in Iceland.
Part of  our second expectation was concerned with the seriousness of  corruption. 
According to this, the public should be more prone to believe that serious corruption 
takes place than the other groups. We have no absolute standard against which we can 
measure the seriousness of  corruption. One way, however, to assess the seriousness of  
corruption in a country where the rule of  law is well established is to consider its legality 
or illegality. Two of  the types of  corruption which were considered in our questionnaire 
are unequivocally illegal, i.e. bribes and embezzlement. The three remaining types are 
sometimes illegal and usually ethically questionable, but may not always imply law break-
ing in the strictest sense, at least in the manner we put the questions. Threats in the case 
of  extortion may be implicit or hinted at rather than explicit. Avoiding uncomfortable 
information is often a question of  putting the right spin on an issue rather than violating 
the public information act. And interfering with public appointments to non-political 
positions is an art form well established in Icelandic politics and administration without 
necessarily involving law-breaking.7 In this sense, bribes and embezzlement are more 
serious forms of  corruption than the other three. According to the second part of  our 
second expectation, we should expect the difference between public perceptions and 
the other two groups to be greater with regard to the more serious forms of  corruption 
than with regard to the less serious ones. 
Looking back at table 4, the pattern seems broadly consistent with the second part 
of  our second expectation. The public is 1.2 – 1.7 times more likely to think fraud, ex-
tortion and favoritism are common than the experts while it is 2.3 – 3.0 times more likely 
to think embezzlement and bribes common. A similar pattern holds for the practition-
ers. The public is 3.4 – 3.7 times more likely than the practitioners to think that favorit-
ism, fraud and extortion are common and it is 11.3 – 25.5 times more likely to think that 
embezzlement and bribes are common. 
Thus, we maintain, our findings support of  the perceptual bias support. The ublic is 
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more likely to think that corruption is common than groups with an information advan-
tage, and the difference gap grows the more serious forms of  corruption we consider.8
We have, of  course, no conclusive way of  establishing that the expert and practi-
tioner perceptions are more accurate than those of  the public. This is simply an assump-
tion on which our research design is based. There are however two strong arguments 
for taking their perceptions more seriously. In the first place there is hardly any doubt 
that these groups know more about what goes on in the murky corners of  the political 
system than the general public. They are likely to have both greater general knowledge 
of  how the system works and greater personal experience – first or second hand.9 Sec-
ondly, the perceptions of  the experts and practitioners are to a far greater extent based 
on personal experience than those of  the public. In table 4 above, we found only very 
modest correlations between the direct experience of  the public of  corruption and its 
perceptions of  corruption. In table 5 we produce comparable figures for the experts 
and practitioners. 
Table 5. Correlations between corruption perceptions and ‘directness of experi-
ence’ among experts and municipal practitioners
Type of perception-
experience relationship
Voters Experts Municipal practitioners
Bribes .33*** .61*** .42***
Embezzlement .37*** .50*** .26***
Fraud .30*** .28* .49***
Extortion .37*** .23 .56***
Favoritism .32*** .27* .53***
While we would expect the experts primarily to have second hand knowledge of  
corruption it seems that personal experience of  the more serious types is likely to influ-
ence their perceptions significantly. This may mean that they are skeptical concerning 
corruption claims unless they have first-hand experience of  it. The practitioners, on the 
other hand, tend to base their corruption perceptions more on direct experience than 
voters except in the cases of  embezzlement. The deviation in the case of  embezzlement 
remains a puzzle to a certain extent, but it should be kept in mind that according to both 
the experts and practitioners, embezzlement is relatively rare.
3.3 Do emotive factors influence perceptions of corruption?
If  public perceptions of  corruption have little to do with direct experience and seem 
rather exaggerated compared to better informed groups, the question arises: how does 
the public form their beliefs about corruption? Research cited above indicates that emo-
tive factors may play a role and our third expectation states that emotive factors, in-
cluding ideological ones, probably influences perceptions of  corruption. To study this, 
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respondents from the general public sample were asked about voting intentions, using 
standard questionnaire items from the Social Science Research Institute. To indicate 
closeness to government the parties were ranked according to their share of  govern-
ment power since the turn of  the century. The party with the longest periods in govern-
ment is the Independence Party (IP), followed by the Progressive Party (PP), the Social 
Democratic Alliance (SDA), the Left Greens (LG) and “others” (an array of  populist 
forces mainly but not exclusively on the centre-left). 
Figure 1. Perceptions of corruption among supporters of different parties (0 low, 
5 high)
Note: The actual scale in the question was from 1 to 6
In each case we get a broadly similar pattern. Supporters of  ‘insider’ parties (those 
who have had more share of  governmental power after the turn of  the century) perceive 
smaller corruption than supporters of  ‘outsider’ parties. Thus, supporters of  the Inde-
pendence Party in all cases perceive a smaller amount of  corruption than those of  all the 
other parties while supporters of  new or non-represented parties (the ‘other’ category) 
perceive the greatest amount of  corruption (tying with the Left Greens in the case of  fa-
voritism). This is irrespective of  the majority in the particular municipality in which the 
question was asked, which yielded no significant results. If  we perceive insider-outsider 
status as an ordinal scale and correlate it with perceptions of  overall political corruption 
in Iceland we get a Spearman’s rho of  -.38 which indicates a stronger relationship than 
obtained through the analysis of  corruption experience among voters. Ideological or 
partisan factors, in other words, provide an equally or even slightly stronger account of  
corruption perceptions than experience of  corruption.
 This simple test gives only a rough indicator of  the relationship between emo-
tive factors and perceptions of  corruption. The data lacks further information concern-
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ing such factors but our analysis seems to indicate a promising path for future research. 
The question remains, however, if  only the general public is receptive to emotive factors 
or if  they may affect expert groups as well. As noted above there are considerable vari-
ations in the perceptions of  corruption among our experts and our practitioners. The 
experts from the public administration association perceive a greater amount of  corrup-
tion at the local level than the practitioners. It is important to select expert groups for 
survey purposes so as to minimize the amount of  bias likely to affect their evaluations. 
One indicator that a bias exists may be the presence of  large variations in the experts’ 
evaluations. Experts who disagree wildly lack credibility. With this in mind it is interest-
ing to compare the answers of  our two groups concerning the spread of  corruption in 
Iceland. 
Table 6. How widespread is corruption in Iceland? Expert and practitioner 
evaluations
Experts Practitioners
Among politicians
Very widespread 9,5 3,9
Rather widespread 37,8 20,7
Rather rare 45,9 55,9
Hardly takes place 6,8 19,6
Total 100,0 100,0
Among public employees
Very widespread 4,2 1,1
Rather widespread 13,9 13,1
Rather rare 61,1 67,4
Hardly takes place 20,8 18,3
Total 100,0 100,0
Among local governments
Very widespread 9,7 1,1
Rather widespread 33,3 13,6
Rather rare 45,8 57,1
Hardly takes place 11,1 28,2
Total 100,0 100,0
The picture we get is that in all cases between 46% and 67% agree on a single alterna-
tive, which in all cases is ‘rather rare’. This seems to indicate a relatively broad consensus 
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among experts that corruption is rather rare. If  we add ‘rather rare’ and ‘hardly takes 
place’ we get 53% to 87%, i.e. somewhere between a clear and an overwhelming major-
ity. The evaluation of  corruption we get through this data is very unlike the one exam-
ined in table 2 above, according to which 57% to 69% of  the public believed corruption 
to be rather or very common. While we take this to indicate that expert opinion goes 
against the mainstream evaluation among the public, it should nonetheless be noted that 
a sizeable minority of  the experts believe corruption to be rather widespread, especially 
among politicians and in local government. 
Another cause for concern is the difference between the experts and the municipal 
practitioners. Whether the estimates of  the experts or the practitioners are more accu-
rate is difficult to establish. The evaluations of  the practitioners in the case of  municipal 
government is suspect, of  course, given their close association with it. In a sense, the 
practitioners are answering here as ‘insiders’ and can be suspected of  having a stake in 
portraying their own backyard as less corrupt than they actually believe it is. Having a 
political or administrative career in municipal government may hence hold back these 
respondents’ statements about the spread of  corruption, or, alternatively make them 
more tolerant of  what they may perceive as the practical necessities of  local governance; 
hence, not admitting that corruption is actually taking place. Yet, one should also note 
that practitioners not only think corruption less widespread at the municipal level but 
also among politicians and civil servants more generally. 
Table 7. Evaluations of corruption among local politicians and administrators (%)
Politicians Administrators Total
Corruption among politicians
Common 20 31 25
Rare 80 69 75
Total (N) 100 (105) 100 (70) 100 (175)
Corruption among civil servants
Common 18 9 14
Rare 86 91 86
Total (N) 100 (101) 100 (69) 100 (170)
Municipal corruption
Common 16 12 14
Rare 84 88 86
Total (N) 100 (105) 100 (68) 100 (173)
Table 7 suggests that there is not a great deal of  difference between the perceptions 
of  municipal politicians and administrators, although greater belief  among administra-
tors in corruption among politicians is to some extent telling, while politicians are more 
likely to suspect civil servants of  corruption. Thus, insider groups may wish to downplay 
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the corruption going on in their own backyard. Both groups, however, are clearly less 
inclined to believe in widespread corruption compared to the experts. A contributing 
factor is probably that separation in the tasks of  politicians and administrators at the 
local level are less well established than in the national administration. Only the highest 
level administrators were included among our respondents, a group which is likely to be 
well integrated in political life, and in many cases includes non-elected mayors, who are 
usually closely associated with the political majority.
4. Conclusions
The debate about the pros and cons of  international indices and their uses of  expert 
perceptions captures a dilemma about how corruption could and should be measured. 
While some scholars highlight the advantages of  employing expert perceptions, others 
have demonstrated a marked difference between the views of  experts on the one hand, 
and the views of  the public on the other. 
On a general level, this controversy frames the overarching theme we have been 
interested in: Whose perceptions about what should be taken into account when we are 
interested in gauging to what extent corruption constitutes a problem in a given coun-
try? More precisely, we wanted to make an attempt to disentangle what factors seem to 
shape how corruption perceptions are formed by opening up one so called ‘low corrupt 
country’ and see what influences how different segments of  the demographics within 
the one and same country view the problem.
So, where to look? In recent years, the case of  Iceland has been highlighted as an 
example that illustrates how badly calibrated corruption indices may be – judged to be 
the world´s least corrupt country in 2004-2005 by Transparency International’s CPI, 
then plummeting heavily first after the financial crisis in 2008 (and the debate that then 
followed suit concerning whether corruption and related practices may have played a 
role in generating the economic crash). We argue that Iceland has important advantages 
if  one wants to understand which factors shape perceptions of  corruption. The country 
is homogeneous in so many theoretically relevant respects while the extent of  corrup-
tion is highly contested. In order to gauge what factors shape perceptions of  corruption, 
we focused on three different groups of  actors within the Icelandic demographic: ‘the 
public’, ‘the experts’, and ‘the practitioners’.
Increasing use of  perception measures as indicators of  corruption calls for a critical 
evaluation of  the factors which may influence or bias results. Our focus was on three such 
factors. In the first place we show that perceptions of  corruption in Iceland vary consider-
ably according to the level of  information which respondents are likely to possess. Thus, 
respondents among the general public were much more prone to believe corruption to 
be widespread than groups which ex ante can be argued to have a substantial information 
advantage. Although we noted some differences among the expert groups, a sizeable ma-
jority believed corruption to be rather rare, contrary to prevailing views among the public. 
In some cases, of  course, lack of  systematic or generalized knowledge among the 
public may be compensated for by a great amount of  direct experience of  corruption. 
232 STJÓRNMÁL
&
STJÓRNSÝSLA
Measuring corruption: whose 
perceptions should we rely on? 
Evidence from Iceland
Direct experience is a far more objective indicator of  corruption than perceptions. In 
the Icelandic case, however, the vast majority of  respondents among the public has no 
personal experience of  corruption, hence, their beliefs that corruption is so widespread 
must be based on something else. Although our data on emotive factors is limited, we 
found evidence that support for insider vs. outsider parties was significantly related to 
perceptions of  corruption – in fact the effect was stronger than obtained by any meas-
ure of  experience of  corruption. And although we have not been able to analyze it with 
the data we have at hand here, maybe we are be witnessing something similar to what 
van de Valle (2008) found in the Belgian case, i.e. that perceptions of  corruption seem 
to be embedded in general attitudes towards government, and this indicator therefore 
primarily measures general attitude of  distrust towards the administration, and therefore 
should not been used as an indicator of  actual corruption.
At the outset we contrasted the two conflicting perspectives of  unbiased learning and 
perceptual bias and formulated expectations derived from the latter. These were in the first 
place that direct experience of  corruption would prove a weak predictor of  corruption 
perceptions; secondly that public perceptions would deviate considerably from those 
of  groups with an information advantage and thirdly that emotive factors were likely to 
influence perceptions of  corruption significantly. All three expectations were confirmed 
by our data, lending support to the perceptual bias perspective concerning public per-
ceptions of  corruption. This indicates that public perceptions of  corruption need to be 
approached with caution as indicators of  corruption. Dismissing the unbiased learning 
perspective altogether, however, may be premature. Our data does not contain a com-
parative dimension. Some research has revealed comparative evidence of  a relationship 
between public corruption perceptions and corruption experiences (Charron 2016) as 
well as between public and expert perceptions (Holmberg 2009). This could indicate 
that even if  public perceptions may be exaggerated they may nonetheless reflect un-
derlying factors which are related to experience and expert evaluations. In our data we 
found that even if  public perceptions are likely to be exaggerated they are nonetheless 
similar to the evaluations of  the expert groups concerning the relative frequency of  the 
different types of  corruption. While we cannot be sure if  this underlying factor is the 
actual level of  corruption or perhaps some feature of  the public debate, the fact that the 
pattern among municipal practitioners – who are both experienced and clearly skepti-
cal concerning public wisdom on municipal corruption – is broadly similar to the one 
among the public may offer a significant clue. 
The relevance of  our study concerns not only the two different approaches of  unbi-
ased learning and perceptual bias but also the methodological one of  whose perceptions 
we should look for as proxy measures for corruption. Given a choice between expert 
evaluations and public perceptions our conclusion is in line with the prevailing view 
that expert perceptions are to be preferred. But expert perceptions can clearly differ. 
In the Icelandic case there exists long-standing skepticism concerning the evaluations 
of  foreign businesspeople on which TI relies a lot. They are unlikely to have substantial 
first-hand knowledge of  different types of  corruption in Iceland and even less likely 
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to have a balanced theoretical overview. In the choice of  expert groups, we should ask 
three questions. Are they likely to have the broadly based knowledge and conceptual 
understanding in order to make proper evaluations? Are they likely to have direct expe-
rience of  corruption which might compensate for lack of  general knowledge? Are they 
likely to be affected by emotive factors of  any kind, ranging from ideological factors 
to self-justification. In our research design we selected two elite groups with different 
characteristics in this respect. The ‘experts’ (members of  the Public Administration As-
sociation) are likely to have theoretical knowledge and good conceptual understanding 
but may vary in experience. They are, moreover, not likely to be especially ideologically 
motivated. The second elite group, the municipal practitioners, consist of  council mem-
bers and executives of  the municipalities. They are likely to be less theoretically profi-
cient than the experts but with greater experience of  the actual levels of  corruption. 
However, their answers may be more influenced by emotive factors than those of  the 
expert given their greater involvement with political life and perhaps a tendency for self-
justification given their proximity with municipal governance. Given a choice between 
the experts and municipal practitioners the expert perceptions therefore seem a better 
choice as an indicator of  the actual level of  corruption. 
Our data allows us to present a more nuanced view of  corruption in Iceland than 
hitherto available through sledge hammer statistics of  the kind presented by TI or 
through public perceptions of  corruption. Whereas placing Iceland as the least corrupt 
state in the world is likely to underestimate both various types of  corruption taking place 
and the overall level, the deeply pessimistic view obtained through public perceptions is 
likely to be an overstatement as well. If  we go by the groups most likely to have good 
general knowledge and first-hand experience, we come to the conclusion that corrup-
tion is rare but still clearly discernible. Less serious types of  corruption, such as favorit-
ism in public appointments and failure to disclose information, are more common than 
more serious forms such as extortion, bribes and embezzlement. Nonetheless, it should 
be noted, that a sizeable minority of  the experts still believes corruption to be common, 
especially in the case of  favoritism and fraud. 
We believe that the results that have been presented here are all but trivial, and they 
could potentially have important policy implications. Many international aid-donors use 
indices as a guide when conditioning developmental aid (e.g. Kurtz & Schrank 2007; 
Andvig 2005). In line with some previous studies, our findings imply that measures of  
corruption seem to have their intrinsic problems, suffering from perceptual bias, adverse 
selection of  experts, and also some conceptual fuzziness – i.e. mainly focusing on bribe-
giving and bribe-taking. Perhaps it is the case that, at least when it comes to the devel-
oped world and so called ‘mature welfare states’, that neither the foreign experts (who 
tend to underestimate the domestic problems) nor the domestic public (which tends to 
overestimate the domestic problems), are the right demographics to consult; but rather 
we should turn to some mix of  domestic, well-educated experts that are presented with 
questions about different forms of  corrupt/illicit behavior, in order to get a more cali-
brated and nuanced picture of  the problem at hand. 
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Notes
1  The project was part of  the Power and Democracy project at the University of  Iceland. The aut-
hors are greatful for the comments of  two anonymous reviewers on an earlier version of  the paper. 
2 http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SI.POV.GINI/rankings
3 http://gagnatorg.gallup.is/survey/data/list/cat_id:2293
4 Iceland switched from party controlled press and public radio and television under political scrutiny 
during the 1980s and 1990s to a more commercialized system. The political forces remain highly 
sensitive to the management of  public  radio and television as well as ownership of  private media, 
cf. Kristinsson 2012, 196-197.
5 Our basic approach was to use non-technical terms describing the conduct in question in order to 
minimize the risk of  different groups understanding the questions in different ways. In the case of  
extortion the Icelandic version was “að stjórnmálamenn eða opinberir starfsmenn í sveitarfélögum á Íslandi láti 
undan hótunum af  einhverju tagi”, for embezzlement we used “nýti aðstöðu sína til að draga til sín fjármuni 
eða afla tekna umfram það sem þeim ber í launagreiðslur”, bribes was “þiggi greiðslur eða hlunnindi fyrir að hygla 
þeim sem slíkt býður”, fraud was “leyni mikilvægum upplýsingum eða gefi vísvitandi villandi upplýsingar til að 
forðast gagnrýni”, and favoritism “mismuni aðilum við ráðningar í störf  vegna pólitískra tengsla, kunningskapar 
eða frændsemi”.
6 A noticeable feature of  the corruption perceptions indicated in table 2, is that compared to the 
ICENES study, conducted only a year-and-a-half  earlier, perceptions of  corruption seem to have 
increased markedly. To us it seems highly unlikely that corruption or corruption related events can 
explain this variation between the two surveys to a satisfactory degree. For instance, although not a 
corruption scandal proper, our survey took place well before the exposures of  the Iceland-related 
Panama papers-scandal in the spring of  2016. We believe that the most likely explanation for the 
increase in 2014 is that the questions were asked at the end of  the questionnaire after respondents 
had been subjected to a large number of  questions on corruption which were likely to focus their 
attention on the problem. This may indicate that perceptions of  corruption are volatile although it 
is of  course not conclusive evidence.
7 The power of  politicians to make appointments to many administrative positions is uncontested 
and a certain amount of  discretion is legally recognized. But they also have considerable power in 
shaping the whole process, including the timing of  advertisements, how evaluation of  candidates 
takes place and the precise qualifications asked for when positions are advertised. For further dis-
cussion, see Kristinsson (2012).
8 One could raise objections to our interpretations and pose alternative explanations as to why ‘ex-
perts’ and ‘practitioners’ perceive less corruption than does the public. Iceland is a small country, 
our samples in these two groups are rather small, and the survey asks about controversial questions 
with potential adverse consequences for this groups of  respondents. If  respondents do not trust the 
anonymity of  the survey, they may have moderated their answers, stating lower levels of  corruption 
than they de facto think there is. However, we do not believe in such an alternative explanation. 
Taking part in the surveys was entirely voluntary. If  respondents felt they had anything to fear, they 
would not have taken part. Additionally, the survey was carried out by a highly respected agency, the 
Social Science Research Institute, which is known for discretion and confidentiality. Furthermore, 
the experts were not asked any background questions except for gender, which makes triangulation 
impossible. Concerning the other group – the practitioners –  they did get background questions, 
but the sample contains a much greater number of  persons so that finding out about individual 
respondents would have been impossible given the small number of  background questions asked 
(gender, educational level, size category of  municipality, elected representative or not). If  these 
respondents were concerned about traceability they could skip individual questions.
9 We cannot exclude the possibility that the ‘outsiders’ may regard themselves as sufferers of  cor-
ruption and hence likely to take it more seriously than others. Our data, however, shows hardly any 
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effects of  income and very little of  education on public perceptions of  corruption. Moreover, as 
our data indicates, most people in Iceland have never – in their lives if  we take the answers liter-
ally – come into direct contact with the different forms of  corruption we ask about. Seeing them as 
especially victimized by corruption therefore seems rather difficult to establish.
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